A Metaphilosophical Critique of the Philosophy of Race and the Black-white Binary
by Ria Lisso, Philosophy
This essay critiques the Philosophy of Race, primarily in the United States, for perpetuating the Black-white Binary and failing to overcome white supremacist ideology. The Black-white Binary is a conceptual framework that centralizes racial discourse primarily around Black and white identities, marginalizing other racial experiences. While the Philosophy of Race aims to analyze race, historical discrimination, and social justice, its reliance on the Black-white Binary undermines otherwise complex racial dynamics. Building on well-known philosophers, including Paul C. Taylor, Kathryn Gines, Linda Martín Alcoff, and Sally Haslanger, this paper proposes a pluralist approach for the Philosophy of Race to distance itself from the Black-white Binary and better analyze the experiences of all racialized groups.
First, the essay examines the persistence of the Black-white Binary in philosophical and historical discourse, emphasizing how its restrictions overflow from education and mass media into the Philosophy of Race. Second, Taylor’s concept of racialization is introduced to provide a general understanding of what a study of race should encompass to be accurate and comprehensive. Then the negative repercussions of the Black-white Binary are discussed, such as “spectrum-thinking,” which positions race as a linear hierarchy with Black and white as two extremes. The result is minority-on-minority hostility and individual frustration. Finally, the paper introduces the pluralist approach informed by Alcoff’s theory of embodiment and Haslanger’s theory of social construction. This approach advocates for an expanded framework that integrates other marginalized perspectives, without diminishing the Black experience. This paper provides a metaphilosophical argument that does not advance a specific theory in Philosophy of Race but rather critiques the discipline itself. The Philosophy of Race must develop more inclusive discourse to better fulfill its goals. Only then can philosophy properly challenge systemic racism and produce an equitable understanding of racialization in the United States and beyond.
philosophy, race, binary, racialization, diversity
This essay critiques the Philosophy of Race for perpetuating the Black-white Binary and failing to overcome white supremacist ideology. The Philosophy of Race considers concepts such as race, racism, and ethnicity to explore and (re)construct various historical accounts of race while analyzing relevant repercussions (Gines 28). This essay primarily focuses on the Philosophy of Race in the United States, emphasizing the weight of immigration and globalization. In the United States, the Black-white Binary is a conceptual framework that centers racial discourse around white and Black groups that hold an oppressor-oppressed relationship. Juan F. Perea, a professor at the Loyola University of Chicago, defines the Black- white Binary as “the conception that race in America consists either exclusively or primarily” of the Black and white race (Perea 7), and that this “paradigm dictates all other racial identities and groups in the United States” (Perea 8). The Black-white Binary traces back to the colonial backdrop of American history, naturally becoming America’s dominant view on racial dynamics—including, through no fault of its own, in the Philosophy of Race. However, with the United States’ diverse population, racial dynamics have grown increasingly complex, demanding that the Philosophy of Race stay true to its name and treat “race” as the broad, comprehensive term it is.
I introduce a meta-argument that the Philosophy of Race should adopt a pluralist approach to account for various racial experiences and better fulfill its goals. These goals include analyzing race, discussing well-documented and under-documented historical discrimination, and achieving social justice. First, I will explore the persistence of the Black-white Binary and its presence in philosophy. Then, I will draw on Paul C. Taylor’s concept of racialization to understand the key goals of the Philosophy of Race and demonstrate how the Black-white Binary falls short of these goals. Finally, I will introduce an alternative pluralist approach, incorporating Linda Martín Alcoff’s theory of embodiment and Sally Haslanger’s critical theory of social construction. The argument I introduce is not a specific theory of race and racism, but a structural recommendation to expand the scope of the Philosophy of Race to truly include all groups deemed “races.” The pluralist approach does not intend to undermine or limit the discussion of the Black struggle but aims to enhance our understanding of racial dynamics by integrating other marginalized experiences and inter-minority relations.
To critique the Black-white Binary, we must understand its role in the Philosophy of Race. Discussions about race often center around slavery, segregation, civil rights, and other aspects of colonialism. Kathryn Gines argues that this emphasis reinforces the Black-white Binary by focusing exclusively on Black-white conflicts “to the neglect of other racial, ethnic, and diasporic categories” (Gines 28). This neglect may sound reasonable given the United States’ history of reliance on slave labor. However, a deeper look reveals that the Black-white Binary negatively affects not only the neglected populations, but also America’s Black population. Linda Martín Alcoff writes in Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self that the Black-white Binary proves more of an “obstacle… than an aid” to fostering good relationships between racial groups (Gines 30). The importance of maintaining “good relationships” is not exclusive to the Black-white binary, but includes inter-minority relations as well.
An interesting acknowledgment of the Black-white Binary’s limitations is seen in Paul C. Taylor’s book Race: A Philosophical Introduction, a modern philosophical analysis of race. Taylor broadly acknowledges other racial experiences, such as the Latinx community for being most subject to race-thinking and fostering new racial and ethnic identities (Taylor 143). At the same time, he predominantly focuses on the unique struggle of America’s Black population (Gines 29). While acknowledging the dominance of the Black-white Binary is an important step that Taylor takes, scarcely analyzing other racial discourse is not a satisfying introduction to race, whether in the United States or a broader context. Other philosophers, including Sundstrom and Seth, argue that the pertinence of the Black-white Binary in literature and philosophy overlooks other racial experiences in America, often reducing their presence to mere acknowledgments. Gines, through her observations of the Philosophy of Race and its major voices, addresses a racial project that is both complex and growing, revealing the unobvious but fatal flaws of the Black-white Binary.
Understanding the flaws of the Black-white Binary requires examining the goals of the Philosophy of Race. These goals should be feasible and inclusive, while avoiding the undermining of the Black experience—or any racial experience. To remain inclusive and understand which groups these goals apply to, a general notion of racialization must be established. Paul Taylor asserts that racialization is “taking some superficial information about a human body and that body’s ancestry… [to draw] inferences about deeper and more distant matters” (Taylor 21). Racialization underscores daily experiences for various groups in America, where assumptions are made about their bodies. Taylor further argues that the purpose of race-thinking (and therefore the Philosophy of Race) “allows us to track the effects of racial discrimination” (Taylor 56). For example, Taylor acknowledges that societies should and do pursue collective social goals for the good of all subjugated communities (Taylor 178).
And the jump from analyzing race to furthering social justice requires “telling more comprehensive stories”—not only from the victors’ perspective, but also from the “vanquished” (Taylor 138). Even if the Philosophy of Race is not expected to play a major role in documenting historical discrimination compared to other fields (such as history or anthropology), the role of the Philosophy of Race in analyzing and understanding race is an important prerequisite. A proper analysis of what should be documented, and its meaning, should precede the proper process of documenting historical discrimination. Likewise, the process should be followed by inclusive analyses and reflections. Since Philosophy plays a critical role in both initial and post-documentation analysis, proper racial discourse must include all marginalized groups—a requirement the Black-white Binary undermines.
The Black-white Binary highlights key struggles for freedom and equality that persist today, as evident in society’s priorities. Policies, such as affirmative action, are based on Black-white conflict; media coverage often highlights Black-white tensions, such as police brutality and monument regulations; and the use of racist language and stereotypes against Black people is heavily scrutinized. Other groups that face similar realities receive far less attention and support. In the United States education system, Cheah recognizes that “histories of racial minorities often receive scant coverage or are not included in mainstream textbooks” (Cheah 119). For instance, there is a primary focus on the trans-Atlantic slave trade, yet U.S. demographics “demand that students learn about the histories and narratives of various racial minorities” (Cheah 120), including devastating events such as the Seven Years War, mass-stereotyping of Native Indians, the Philippine-American War, the Chinese Exclusion Act, mass deportation events, the Zoot riots, and anti-Arab sentiment to name a few. When these events are mentioned, it is often in passing, providing little understanding and representation of today’s diverse United States. Cheah makes a point that the inclusion of multicultural perspectives and history should not “[minimize] the historical suffering of slavery and ongoing discrimination” of African Americans (Cheah 120), strengthening this essay’s caution to maintain critical discourse around the Black experience.
It is important to keep in mind Black experiences while acknowledging that, in this country, the spectrum of Black and white is a white supremacist construct. White supremacy, by design, has made itself the center of attention in American history and politics in a way that emphasizes the creation of Blackness as distinct from whiteness. Taylor links social constructionism with the invented idea of “Blackness” and how it was used to subjugate slaves of African descent. Various such ideas are seen in historical documents, such as Thomas Jefferson describing Black inferiority as an “unfortunate difference of color” in Notes on the State of Virginia (Taylor 38). Taylor accurately points out such racist sentiment; however, without further acknowledgment of other racialized groups resulting from social constructionism, a dangerous consequence results—the enforcement of the Black-white Binary through what I will name “spectrum-thinking.” Spectrum-thinking refers to an imagined spectrum, with “Black” and “white” on either end. These ends become the center of racial discourse. Black is considered the “least privileged” and white the “most privileged,” with everyone else in between. The idea that one minority has it worse, while other minorities are at the same time overlooked, results in a lack of solidarity among these minorities that undercuts the struggle against white supremacy.
While it is intuitive to assert that being Black in the United States makes you worse off than other racial groups, the claim is flawed in two ways. One—it is unrealistic to compare the struggles of various minorities. For instance, anti-Black racism, anti-immigrant and anti-Asian xenophobia, and anti-Indigenous genocide are unique in their foundation and effects and cannot be ranked on a single spectrum. Two—it does not make sense to impose spectrum-thinking onto such unique experiences, as it fosters resentment between subjugated groups. Since the two extremes are prioritized, people feel they are either underacknowledged or over- discriminated against, pitting minorities against each other and further stabilizing white supremacy.
Recall that the goals of the Philosophy of Race include the extensive analysis of discrimination and a collective effort for social justice. The Black-white Binary enforces spectrum thinking, which in turn limits the documentation of discrimination that other groups experience. As a result, efforts to obtain social justice are restricted to cases involving the two extremes of the Black-white Binary. Not only are social justice efforts for other minorities limited, but their struggles are under-discussed and appear less pertinent. A prominent example lies in the Hispanic community. A young Hispanic woman, Emanuel Padilla, recounts in her blog “Beyond Racial Binary” the experience of attending an event where speakers from different backgrounds discuss “race, diversity, and the city” (Padilla par. 1). When a Hispanic and Asian pastor were asked to discuss the emphasis on the Black-white Binary, they surprisingly responded that the race discussion is adequate “as is,” with one saying that “‘blackness and whiteness are the two archetypes for us to understand race. We can’t understand [other races] without first understanding these two primary types’” (Padilla par. 2). The pastors are using “primary types” to refer to the Black race and the white race. The author describes how these claims made her feel dismissible, as if her ancestors’ stories were not important enough to stand on their own. For instance, such a framework leaves out “the displacement of Ibero-Americans and the eastern narrative of the United States,” whose realities are demonstrated across art and history (Padilla par. 13).
The Black-white Binary, through its focus on white supremacy, overlooks such feelings of resentment and fails to hold accountable minority-on-minority prejudice that results from spectrum thinking. For instance, Latinx and African American relations can often be tense or violent and involve urban competition for resources. The model minority expectation of Asians has resulted in economic inequalities that favor Asian communities over Black communities, which can be seen in comparing 2020-2021 median annual income among men of various ages (SSA Research, Statistics, & Policy Analysis). In every age category, Asian men earned more than Black men; such discrepancies result in hostility and stereotypes that perpetuate racism beyond the white beholder.
The following examples concerning interracial identities demonstrate how using the Black-white Binary as a foundation for understanding other racial dynamics overlooks the complexities and contradictions that emerge across racial narratives. Since Loving v. Virginia legalized interracial marriage in 1967, a 2017 report found that white people are the least likely of all races to intermarry in the United States (Livingston par. 3). Additionally, Hispanics and Asians are “by far the most likely to intermarry in the U.S.” (Livingston par. 4), exceeding Black-white marriages. A unique aspect of this reality is the fetishization of Asian women and white envy across Asia. In “Why Yellow Fever Isn’t Flattering: A Case Against Racial Fetishes,” Robin Zheng explores the “morally objectionable” hyper-sexualization of Asian women and “the disproportionate psychological burdens it places” on them (Zheng par. 1). Many Asian countries have an inferiority complex when interacting with the West. The dynamic stems from ingrained white supremacy and is used to justify the continuous fetishization of East Asian women. White men are often considered the most desirable partners due to their colonial background, privileged status, and even beauty standards. As a result, rather than recognizing the fetishization of East Asian women as hyper-sexualization, “yellow fever” is normalized. Some evidence of “yellow fever” can be seen in skewed marriage proportions, where 15% of interracial marriages consist of Asian women marrying white men—the second most common interracial pairing in 2017 (Livingston par. 14). As with Zheng’s example, we can respect that this experience of fetishization must be unique from the widespread prejudice from whites and minorities against marrying a Black partner. “Yellow fever” demonstrates that the Black-white Binary cannot use the Black experience of interracial marriage to explain other instances of interracial marriage.
Another experience that varies drastically between Black people and other minorities is the one-drop rule, where having “one drop” of Black blood in your ancestry means you are Black. This rule only accounts for the experiences of mixed identities who are Black and white. Many other mixed identities have no race to call their own; they often face rejections from both sides of the community—whether white or not—and a unique sense of isolation.
To address gaps in understanding such as those mentioned above, Gines asserts that we must acknowledge the Philosophy of Race’s perpetuation of the Black-white Binary while “[theorizing] racialization and racism(s) in more inclusive and complex ways” (Gines 34). The pluralist approach I propose below better satisfies the goals of the Philosophy of Race that are properly analyzing discrimination and progressing toward racial justice, while avoiding problems such as spectrum thinking. The pluralist approach utilizes Haslanger’s account of social constructionism and Alcoff’s theory of racial embodiment to expand the Black-white Binary.
Haslanger’s account of social constructionism in her paper “A Social Constructionist Analysis of Race” emphasizes that race and other labels are not biological, but social creations rooted in power structures. People’s ideas of what terms such as ‘race’ or ‘gender’ mean are directly related to a “social type” rather than an “objective type” (Haslanger 64). Precisely because race is socially constructed, there is complexity in the way that race was invented. The driving forces of race are always intertwined with other socially constructed categories, such as class, gender, and sexuality, which play an intense role in the daily treatment of individuals.
For instance, to be a Chinese, Brazilian, or American woman in the 1790s, 1890s, or 1990s, are incredibly different experiences of social relations and oppression—yet all women are categorized under the “female” label of sex (Haslanger 65). This example demonstrates that group labels vary heavily with context, such as time and place. I argue that Haslanger’s framework recognizes the interconnectedness of other factors within the Black-white Binary itself, such as the experience of Black women and Black queer people compared to straight Black men, or Black immigrants compared to African Americans.
However, considering these factors is not enough to satisfy the goals of analyzing racial dynamics and historical discrimination. An additional factor is that race is intertwined with race itself—the influence of one racialized group on another. The Black struggle itself intersects with other racialized groups, mixed identities, immigrants, and cultural norms.
Interactions between races and how they shape racial experiences cannot be limited to layered interactions between the white and Black populations. Rather, the Philosophy of Race must consider the interconnectedness of factors like class, gender, and sexuality with other racial categories, and how they vary from community to community. Haslanger provides us with a framework to acknowledge the complexities of social constructionism. And while philosophers such as Paul Taylor demonstrate the complexity of social constructionism, we must use this tool to further address intersectionalities and resulting subjugation. Not only do other racial categories need to be acknowledged as a contributing factor to the complexities of racialization, they must also be properly analyzed to the same depth that the Black-white Binary is explored. The necessity of citing examples, case studies, literature, first-person accounts, interviews, and under-explored sources of real racial experiences is easy to discuss but requires more effort to implement.
Alcoff’s theory of embodiment strengthens the pluralist approach by demonstrating exactly how intersectionalities affect people on an individual level and create incredibly diverse experiences. Alcoff writes in her paper “Towards a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment” that social constructionism often fails to account for the experience of embodiment that plagues racism. Race is a social construct, but it is deeply rooted in the lived experience of having a certain body—the daily treatment one feels given one’s skin color, facial features, etc. (Alcoff 17). For instance, Alcoff refers to Richard Rodriguez’ book Days of Obligation to recount how Rodriguez “echoes the racialization of ambition, in which his desire to be a writer and a public intellectual in the United States cannot be associated with an ‘Indian’ face” (Alcoff 21). Often, internalizations of race are perpetuated on an individual level where people begin to see themselves through the eyes of others. The importance of Alcoff’s theory is that embodiment varies not only from group to group but from person to person.
Having darker skin and being seen as Black is a distinct experience from having Asian features and being sexualized. Being white and Asian and having whiter features than one’s sibling is a distinct family experience when traveling to see relatives. Bodies are diverse, and if embodiment is truly central to the experience of racialization, then the Philosophy of Race must dive deeper into the reality of a manifold socially constructed world.
Considering the second goal of the Philosophy of Race, which is collective social justice, Alcoff dismantles spectrum thinking and provides direct access to improving the lives of all racialized groups. If we can recognize that individuals within a race have varied experiences, it becomes much easier to understand that groups of races will have varied experiences as well.
This awareness dismantles spectrum thinking from its roots, as individuals cannot be linearly compared, with one individual at the bottom and one at the top, and therefore racialized groups can certainly not be linearly compared. Rather, the intersectionalities discussed by Haslanger become more relevant than racialization on its own.
For instance, Haslanger’s framework suggests that achieving racial justice in the queer community first requires analyzing the queer community as a whole. Exploring larger themes, trends, and struggles within the queer community builds an inclusive, general framework that can be further dissected. Then, instead of focusing exclusively on a specific experience such as the Black queer experience or the white male experience, philosophers should dive into the various racial experiences and related intersectionalities of the queer community. Because the general community is addressed, it only feels right to explore all the places and identities with varied experiences around the world and among various groups. This pluralist approach becomes more effective in reducing the Black-white Binary and providing resources that benefit more people. Additionally, Haslanger and Alcoff provide the pluralist view with a key advantage—because race is an invention derived from social ideas, housed in the unique experiences of the body, we know that the Black-white Binary is an invention as well. And since we created it, we can also mend it.
The most difficult challenge of the pluralist approach is the idea that spectrum-thinking is a necessary aspect of the Black-white Binary. After all, Paul Taylor asserts that one valuable aspect of race-thinking is keeping track of the past, and the past does include an abundance of anti-Black sentiment, policy, and brutality. Given the historical significance of the Black struggle and systemic inequality that remains today, it sounds logical that the Black-white Binary is at the forefront of society and philosophy. Some argue that eradicating spectrum- thinking and no longer prioritizing the Black struggle will create an environment where Black progress moves backwards into a deeper feeling of neglect. However, this criticism misunderstands the purpose of the pluralist approach. The pluralist approach does not advocate against discussions of the Black struggle. It is not an argument to undermine the vast impact of slavery and segregation, nor to limit the current discussions of the Philosophy of Race or propose that other minorities compete with the Black struggle. It is quite the opposite. As Haslanger reminds us, we acknowledge the importance of gender, sexuality, religion, etc. in relation to the Black struggle—why not acknowledge the Black struggle in relation to other struggles? The way that other minorities regard Black people is just as important as the way white people regard Black people. Likewise, the stereotypes furthered by Asian, Black, Hispanic, White, Native, and Pacific Islander people about each other, interconnected in a web of competition, are equally important to dismantle.
The Black-white Binary itself enforces the feeling of being left behind. Because spectrum thinking focuses exclusively on its Black and white extremes, the idea that Black people are inferior follows. Other minorities involved in the struggle against white supremacy are overlooked while seeking to maintain their ranking “above” the Black community, rather than viewing themselves as a collective force. The move away from spectrum-thinking will only occur when the Black-white Binary is no longer a binary, and no longer Black and white. It will occur when people’s experiences are viewed as unique yet equally real. The pluralist approach is a critical metaphilosophical method to successfully foster the inclusive environment necessary for a more accurate philosophical analysis of race.
Works Cited
Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Towards a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment (1999).” Radical Philosophy, no. 95, 1999, www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/towards-a-phenomenology-of-racial-embodiment.
Alcoff, Linda Martín. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. Oxford University Press, 2006.
Cheah, Joseph. “Racial Literacy, the Black-White binary, and an Equitable Learning Environment.” The Wabash Center Journal on Teaching, vol. 2, no. 1, 2021, pp. 119-120, https://doi.org/10.31046/wabashcenter.v2i1.1670.
Gines, Kathryn T. “Introduction: Critical Philosophy of Race Beyond the Black/White Binary.” Critical Philosophy of Race, vol. 1, no. 1, 2013, pp. 1-6. Project MUSE, muse.jhu.edu/article/501720/pdf.
Haslanger, Sally. “A Social Constructionist Analysis of Race.” Resisting Reality: A Social Construction and Social Critique, Rutgers University Press, 2012, www.mit.edu/~shaslang/papers/HaslangerASCAR.pdf.
Livingston, Gretchen, and Anna Brown. “Intermarriage in the U.S. 50 Years after Loving v. Virginia.” Pew Research Center, 18 May 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2017/05/18/intermarriage-in-the-u-s-50-years- after-loving-v-virginia/.
Padilla, Emanuel. “Beyond Racial Binary.” World Outspoken, 14 Nov. 2022, www.worldoutspoken.com/articles-blog/beyond-racial-binary.
Perea, Juan F. (1997). “The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal science” of American Racial Thought.” California Law Review, vol. 85, no. 5, 1997, pp. 1213-1258. https://doi.org/10.2307/3481059.
Rodriguez, Richard. Days of Obligation: An Argument with My Mexican Father. Penguin, 1995.
Social Security Administration. “Earnings of Men Aged 20–59, by Age Group and Race/Ethnicity.” Research, Statistics & Policy Analysis, Sept. 2023, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/factsheets/at-a-glance/earnings-men-age-race-ethnicity.html.
Taylor, Paul C. Race: A Philosophical Introduction. 3rd ed., Polity Press, 2022.
Zheng, Robin. “Why Yellow Fever Isn’t Flattering: A Case Against Racial Fetishes.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 2., no. 3, 2016, pp. 400-419. Cambridge University Press, 2016, https://philarchive.org/rec/ROBWYF-2.
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