An Analysis of Discrepancies within the Anglo-Iraqi War Scholastic Debate

by Sam Northenor, History

Abstract: This research paper attempts to determine the driving forces behind the Golden Square military coup and the resulting Anglo-Iraqi War in May of 1941. Both the coup and the war are essential in understanding the motivations and loyalties of both the Iraqi public and state during the 1930s and 1940s, since Iraqi ideologies and loyalties during this period were shaped in the context of World War 2, Anglo-Iraqi imperialism relations, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922, and Anglo-German relations. The recurrent scholastic research regarding these events largely relies on the existence of two separate narratives. The old narrative argues that the reception of German philosophy significantly influenced Arab nationalist feelings within Iraq and was the basis of German influence during the war. The new narrative argues that Iraq’s motivation for the war was not based on German ideology but instead on a three-fold field of reference containing the ideologies of pro-authoritarianism, pro-totalitarianism, and pro-fascism. This paper finds that both narratives are incorrect due to their reliance on one essential fallacy: each argues that Iraqi support of the German state during the Anglo-Iraqi war was built upon a foreign ideology. The existence of pro-German sentiments during the Anglo-Iraqi war was instead based on Iraqi anti-British attitudes, Rashid Ali’s personal motivations and vendetta, and a cultural wave of desire across the Arab states to become the “Arab hero.”

Iraq, Anglo-Iraqi War, Rashid Ali, imperialism, World War II

The intricacies of the 1930s and 1940s Iraqi political scene culminated in the Golden Square military coup and the resulting Anglo-Iraqi War in May of 1941, both key events in Iraq’s history with imperialism and the British state. Iraq’s Golden Square was created in 1930 and was the “effective arbiter of power in Iraq” during the 1930s and 1940s.1 It was comprised of Rashid Ali, the former Prime Minister, and four colonels from the “circle of seven,” a group of  “seven senior officers…[who had] caused the collapse of Hikmat government, introducing an era in Iraqi politics during which civilian politicians held office only with the consent of these men.”2 The Golden Square implemented the coup on April 1st, 1941 and aimed to replace the regent, ‘Abd al-Ilah.3 The coup, which was a resounding success after Rashid Ali was placed in power and a new government was implemented, led to the Anglo-Iraqi War, in which Rashid Ali’s Iraqi government relied on the Axis Powers for aid. The war resulted in a British victory and the ousting of Rashid Ali and his government. The political scene leading up to the coup is key to understanding the motivations and loyalties of both the Iraqi public and the state during the 1930s and 1940s. Iraqi ideologies and loyalties during this period were shaped in the context of World War 2, Anglo-Iraqi imperialism relations, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922, and Anglo-German relations. Due to the complexity of the state of Iraq during this time, historians are often divided on how to categorize the political scene and incidence of pro-German sentiments within the Iraqi state during the Anglo-Iraqi War. Commonly, historians fall into two separate spheres, adhering to either the old or the new narrative. The old narrative relies on the idea that the reception of German ideology significantly and solely influenced Arab nationalist feelings within Iraq, while the new narrative contains a three-fold field of reference consisting of the ideologies of pro-authoritarianism, pro-totalitarianism, and pro-fascism.4 5 Both the new and the old narratives, however, are damaged by one essential fallacy: each argues that Iraqi support of the German state during the Anglo-Iraqi war was built upon a foreign ideology. The incident of pro-German sentiments during the war were not based on ideological similarities with Nazi Germany or any other foreign country but instead based on Iraqi anti-British attitudes, Rashid Ali’s personal motivations, and a cultural wave of desire to be the “Arab hero.”

Eric Davis’ work, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, and Peter Wien’s work, Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, embody both the narrative or historiographical binary and the essential fallacy within the scholastic debate surrounding the Anglo-Iraqi War. Davis’ work is characteristic of the old narrative and emphasizes the idea that German ideology influenced Iraqi nationalist values and that Nazi influence played a large role in the incidence of pro-German sentiments within Iraq in the 1940s. Davis emphasizes the influence of the German ambassador in Rashid’s new government before and during the war by stating, “…one member of Rashi ‘Ali[‘s]…government…Yunis al-Sab’awi..[was] an active member of the al-Muthana club, which, under German ambassador Fritz Groba’s influence.”6 Yunis al-Sab’awi’s active membership in a club that was heavily influenced by a German ambassador coupled with his government position demonstrates the extent of German influence in the Iraqi state prior to and during the Anglo-Iraqi war. Davis also argues that the Iraqi public had been influenced by German and Nazi ideology through the German embassy. Davis states, “…it was confined to Baghdad, where the German embassy had spread Nazi influence.”7 Therefore, Davis’ work is based on the fallacy of assuming the ideological basis of 1940s Iraqi pro-German sentiments. Wien’s work is characteristic of the new narrative but also possesses the fallacy. While Wien moves away from Germany as the sole ideological basis, he still lists other countries and their ideologies as the basis for the war. This reliance on other foreign nationalist ideologies is shown through Wien’s analysis of the Iraqi newspaper al-’Ālam al-Arabi, which states that Japan would be a “favorable example for a positive shaping of the youth”8 and demonstrates that Germany was not the only country that had ideological influence in Iraq. Despite the acceptance of the ideological basis in both spheres of the scholastic binary, an analysis of primary sources disproves both narratives.

Despite the ubiquity of German propaganda in Iraq during the 1930s, an analysis of primary sources within the Cambridge Archives’ Records of Iraq details the lack of influence German ideology had on the Iraqi public’s approach to the Anglo-Iraqi war and their support of the German state. German ideology was commonplace in the Iraqi social and political spheres during the 1930s as Iraq housed a German minister and his staff as part of the German Legation before and during 1939.9 German broadcasts in Arabic were also common in Iraq, and Basil Newton, a British ambassador in Iraq, described German propaganda as “widespread and unscrupulous.”10 Newton further describes the extent and scope of German propaganda and influence in Iraq when he states that “the German minister in Baghdad, with the assistance of money, a host of agents and broadcasts in Arabic on the German wireless, worked unceasingly to spread Pro-German, if not Pro-Nazi, ideas among public opinion in Iraq, particular the army, the students and the tribes.”11 However, the Monthly Intelligence Summaries from the Royal Air Force state, “…it is difficult to assess the effect of the German broadcasts in Arabic on the private listener, inquires in Baghdad appear to indicate that German news is used as a medium for comparison with public broadcasts, and not as an authentic source of information.”12 Despite the German minister’s tireless efforts to spread pro-German propaganda among the Iraqi public opinion, German ideology was not largely supported among the public or even given merit as a source of information, a fact which is missing from the scholastic discourse and disproves the accepted ideological basis.

German influence was also disrupted and largely eliminated due to Britain’s imperial influence in Iraq and the obligations of Iraq in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty at the start of World War 2. These obligations were fulfilled by the state without protest from the Iraqi people, further disproving the notion that the Iraqi people were influenced by German propaganda. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty required that the Iraqi government sever “…diplomatic negotiations with Germany, including…the withdrawal of the German minster and his staff from the German Legation; and…other legislative measures calculated to limit or suppress German activities in [Iraq].”13 The Iraqi public did not protest the German removal and instead exhibited increasing support for the Allied powers. In October 1939, after all German influence had been removed in accordance with the treaty, the Monthly Intelligence Summaries stated, “The attitude of the Iraqi Press has been more favorable towards the Allies and to Democratic Principles in general than it was during the preceding month.”14 This lack of protest demonstrates that the Iraqi people had no authentic stake in German nationalist ideology.

The Iraqi people were also largely antagonistic towards Nazi Germany due to their imperialist notions and their invasion of Poland. In response to the invasion, Basil Newton states, “The German attack on Poland produced a revulsion of feeling against Germany…the Iraqis have recognized quite clearly the definite menace of Hitlerism and are anxious to see it defeated.”15 While German support did resurge Iraq around 1940, Iraqi support for the German state was not ideologically related but instead based solely on Iraqi anti-British attitudes. After multiple Allied losses in the war, Iraqi public opinion was described as having “severely shaken confidence in the certainty of an Allied victory.”16 This shaken confidence led to a resurgence of German presence in Iraq on the basis of anti-British desires. The Iraqi public viewed Germany as the key to finally riding themselves from Britain’s imperialistic influence in their country and their obligations to the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. The Iraqi public’s anti-British sentiments were so deep that the public would accept imperialism from Germany in exchange for freedom from the British, with F.A.G. Cook stating, “…I had sensed a growing feeling of ill-will towards the Allied cause…hoping that the Germans would come and take over Iraq as a change from the British.”17 Therefore, the basis of the Iraqi public’s pro-German attitudes before and during the Anglo-Iraqi War was Iraqi anti-British attitudes, not ideological loyalty to a foreign power.

The Cambridge Archives’ Records of Iraq also detail the lack of influence of German philosophy and ideology in the Iraqi government’s approach to the Anglo-Iraqi war, pro-German sentiments, and the search for Axis aid. Rashid Ali was one of the main proponents of German influence within Iraq, utilizing his position as Prime Minister to steer “Iraq away from its cautiously pro-British stance.., resume telegraphic communication with the Axis powers, retain…diplomatic relations with Italy…[etc.]”18 Rashid was also listed as being “largely responsible for the failure to declare war on Germany,”19 and after his appointment to Prime Minister in March 1940, pro-German and pro-Nazi sentiments began to surge within the country. A British cipher message details this surge of pro-German sentiment when it states, “Rashid Ali’s appointment as Premier has been followed by a noticeable increase in openly expressed pro-Nazi sympathies, and… [a] more active campaign against British prestige and interests.”20 Rashid and his government’s support of Nazi Germany, however, was not based on sharing the Nazi ideology but instead based on Rashid’s own personal feelings in regard to Britain, the cultural wave of desire to be the “Arab hero,” and the indecisiveness of Iraqi politicians in relation to World War 2.

In 1940, Britain conspired with the Iraqi regent to have Rashid replaced as Prime Minister at the end of 1940, a fact which Rashid took personally.21 In November of that year, Rashid tried to commission broadcasts that would specifically condemn Britain’s attempt to remove him, with Simon stating that Rashid “appealed to the Italians to transmit propaganda broadcasts denouncing Britain’s attempt to remove him…the Italians refused, reasoning that the broadcasts would not be in Rashid Ali’s best interests.”22 Rashid utilized German propaganda and the aid provided to his government to fuel his personal vendetta against the British state and promote anti-British ideals. Rashid also participated in a larger regional cultural wave that was occurring during this time, in which politicians sought to be the “saviors” of their Arab state. C.J. Edmonds, a British adviser, detailed this phenomenon in a secret message where he states, “The period mid-July to mid-August was one of intense celebration for politicians anxious to be hailed as saviors of the oppressed Arab states.”23 Rashid was not only an active participant in this phenomenon but was so invested in the premise of the Arab “savior” that he reached the point of obsession, despite the Iraqi public’s lack of conviction on the subject. Basil Newton details the disparity between Rashid Ali and Iraqi public opinion when he states, “Some Iraqis are open to persuasion, but the Prime Minister is rather obsessed…in his vanity, he hopes to be the Arab hero who can use the present opportunity to achieve Arabic ambitions.”24 Supporting Germany and fostering pro-German sentiments within the state would gain German aid for Rashid. With Germany’s help, Rashid could become the “Arab hero” who liberated Iraq from the clutches of imperialist Britain. Other politicians within the Iraqi government during this time also lacked the ideological basis of German support that historians claim is critical to the political scene.

In regard to the support of foreign countries in World War 2, Iraq politicians changed support based on which foreign power was currently ahead in World War 2. The Iraq political scene during this time was described as volatile, with “few Iraq politicians hav[ing] any courage or principles except being on [the] winning side.”25 This lack of conviction undermines the idea of an ideological basis for pro-German sentiments during this time, as Iraq politicians would have supported any country that would have appeared to be the winning side in World War 2. Therefore, the basis of the Iraqi government’s pro-German attitudes before and during the Anglo-Iraqi War was Rashid Ali’s personal attitudes, his obsession with becoming an “Arab hero,” and the volatile nature of Iraq politicians’ loyalties, not any ideological similarities or loyalties to Germany or any other foreign power.

The political environment in 1930s and 1940s Iraq was complex and highly influenced by a myriad of factors, including World War 2, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922, and Iraq’s relationship with Britain. This complexity led to the incorrect assumption among academic scholars about the underlying causes of pro-German sentiments within the Iraqi state. These scholars incorrectly assume that the Iraqi public and government accepted and exhibited pro-German sentiments due to shared ideological values, but in reality, the incident of pro-German sentiments during the war was based on the Iraqi public’s anti-British attitudes, Rashid Ali’s personal vendetta, and the cultural wave of desire to be the “Arab hero.”

Notes

  1. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 1st ed. (University Press, Cambridge, 2000), 99. ↩︎
  2. Tripp, A History of Iraq, 94. ↩︎
  3. Tripp, A History of Iraq, 103. ↩︎
  4. Peter Wien, Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 1932–1941 (Routledge, 2008), 4. ↩︎
  5. Wien, Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 4. ↩︎
  6. Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University Of California Press, 2005), 70. ↩︎
  7. Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, 70. ↩︎
  8. Wien, Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 84. ↩︎
  9. Excerpts from Monthly Intelligence Summaries, Royal Air Force, Habbaniya, September-November 1939, FO 371/23213, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 349. ↩︎
  10. Sir B. Newton, British Embassy, Baghdad, to Foreign Office, London, 20 January 1940, FO 406/78 E 500/500/93, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 365. ↩︎
  11. Sir B. Newton, British Embassy, Baghdad, to Foreign Office, London, 20 January 1940, FO 406/78 E 500/500/93, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 365. ↩︎
  12. Excerpts from Monthly Intelligence Summaries, Royal Air Force, Habbaniya, September-November 1939, FO 371/23213, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 359. ↩︎
  13. Excerpts from Monthly Intelligence Summaries, Royal Air Force, Habbaniya, September-November 1939, FO 371/23213, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 349. ↩︎
  14. Excerpts from Monthly Intelligence Summaries, 355. ↩︎
  15. Sir B. Newton, British Embassy, Baghdad, to Foreign Office, London, 20 January 1940, FO 406/78 E 500/500/93, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 365. ↩︎
  16. Sir B. Newton, British Embassy, Baghdad, to Foreign Office, London, 20 May 1940, FO 371/24558 E 1732/448/93, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 379. ↩︎
  17. British Consulate, Mosul, to British Ambassador, Baghdad, 27 May 1940, FO 371/24558, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 382. ↩︎
  18. Ashley Jackson, Persian Gulf Command: A History of the Second World War in Iran and Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 45. ↩︎
  19. Sir B. Newton, British Embassy, Baghdad to Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary, London, (Nos. 296 and 397), 25 June 1940, FO 406/78 E 2015/G, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 388. ↩︎
  20. Cipher message to Air Ministry, Foreign Office, London, 7 May 1940, FO 371/24558, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 378. ↩︎
  21. Reeva S Simon, Iraq between the Two World Wars (Columbia University Press, 2004), 136. ↩︎
  22. Simon, Iraq between the Two World Wars, 136. ↩︎
  23. C.J. Edmonds (Adviser), Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, Baghdad, to the British Ambassador, Baghdad, 10 October 1940, FO 371/24561, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 395. ↩︎
  24. Sir B. Newton, British Embassy; Baghdad, to Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary, London, 8, 13, July, 28 September 1940, FO 406/78, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 390. ↩︎
  25. Telegram from Sir B. Newton, British Embassy, Baghdad, to Foreign Office, London, enclosing text of telegram from Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to War Office, 1 October 1940, FO 371/24558, in Alan de L. Rush and Jane Priestland, eds., Records of Iraq, 1914-1966, vol. 8: 1936-1941, 394. ↩︎

Acknowledgements: I would like to acknowledge Dr. Jones for fostering my interest in the state of Iraq and encouraging me to submit this paper for publication.

Citation Style: Chicago

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